

EXHIBIT 3

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

June 19, 2012

The Honorable Deanna Okun
International Trade Commission
500 E Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20436

Re: *Certain Gaming Entertainment Consoles, Related Software, and Components Thereof,*
Investigation No 337-TA-752

Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices,
Computers, and Components Thereof, Investigation No 337-TA-745

Dear Chairman Okun:

We write to express concerns with regard to the availability of the exclusion order as a remedy for cases in which "standard-essential patents" (SEPs) are asserted. Although we take no position on the particular merits of the above-captioned cases, we urge the Commission to consider the following public interest arguments carefully as it proceeds with these and other matters in which SEPs are at issue.

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Given the value and importance of industry standards, we trust that you will carefully consider and give due weight to these critical public policy concerns in your analysis. Please keep us advised as your decision making process proceeds.


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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